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dc.contributor.authorCRAMTON, Peter
dc.contributor.authorOCKENFELS, Axel
dc.contributor.authorSTOFT, Steven
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-12T13:40:27Z
dc.date.available2016-01-12T13:40:27Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.citationEconomics of energy & environmental policy, 2015, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 51-64en
dc.identifier.issn2160-5882
dc.identifier.issn2160-5890
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/38365
dc.description.abstractTo promote cooperation in international climate negotiations, negotiators should focus on a common commitment. Such commitments have the advantage of facilitating reciprocal "I will if you will" agreements in a group. Reciprocity is the basis for cooperation in repeated public goods games, and a uniform price would provide a natural focal point for a common international commitment. Such a price is also essential for efficient abatement. Countries would retain flexibility in how to implement the price - with cap-and-trade, a carbon tax, or a hybrid approach. Country risk is reduced relative to risk under international cap-and-trade since carbon revenues stay within the country. Price commitments also tend to equalize effort intensity and can facilitate enforcement. To encourage participation by less-developed countries, a green fund is needed to transfer money from richer to poorer countries. Transfers are smaller and more predictable with a uniform price commitment than with international cap and trade.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics of energy & environmental policyen
dc.titleAn international carbon-price commitment promotes cooperationen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.5547/2160-5890.4.2.aock
dc.identifier.volume4en
dc.identifier.startpage51en
dc.identifier.endpage64en
dc.identifier.issue2en


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