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dc.contributor.authorROY, Suryapratim
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-23T16:12:26Z
dc.date.available2016-02-23T16:12:26Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.issn1725-6739
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/39132
dc.description.abstractIn this article I seek to de-tether the idea of agency from the epistemic pursuits of philosophers and legal scholars working on adaptive preferences and moral responsibility. What is common to such scholars is a move away from conceptualising agency as individual acts of conscious deliberation. While I support a shift in the way agency is understood, I do not find in their work an account of locating and promoting agency as a primary good. For instance, while findings from various psychological sciences are endorsed for their objective findings on individuals, there is little guidance on what such findings mean for how people negotiate social spaces. As a first step, I suggest that an appropriate paradigm for agency would be responsiveness rather than adherence to responsibility. I then proceed to identify properties of a responsiveness paradigm, concentrating on transpositional deliberation, mediation and intelligibility.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI LAWen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2016/04en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectAgencyen
dc.subjectAdaptive preferencesen
dc.subjectBehavioural law and economicsen
dc.subjectPositional objectivityen
dc.subjectResponsibilityen
dc.titleAgency as responsivenessen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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