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dc.contributor.authorCABRALES, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorFERI, Francesco
dc.contributor.authorGOTTARDI, Piero
dc.contributor.authorMELÉNDEZ-JIMÉNEZ, Miguel A.
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-08T13:54:13Z
dc.date.available2016-04-08T13:54:13Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.issn1725-6704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/40625
dc.description.abstractThis paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that these markets are fragile. The reasons are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games. Our subjects provide low-quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary payoff. We show that this is not because subjects play a different (babbling) equilibrium. By analyzing subjects’ behavior in another game, we find that those adopting deceptive strategies tend to have envious or non-pro-social traits. The poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI ECOen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2016/07en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectExperimenten
dc.subjectCheap talken
dc.subjectAuctionen
dc.subjectInformation acquisitionen
dc.subjectInformation saleen
dc.subjectD83en
dc.subjectC72en
dc.subjectG14en
dc.titleCan there be a market for cheap-talk information? : some experimental evidenceen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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