Liberalisation of network industries and access to natural resources : the case of radio spectrum and energy resources

Abstract

The Thesis analyses the impact of the regulation of radio spectrum and energy resources in the liberalisation of wireless communications and electricity in the European Union (EU). The answer to this inquiry presupposes a discussion of three sub-questions: (i) what is the competence of the EU to regulate the radio spectrum and energy resources ("the power gap"); (ii) is there a gap in the regulation of natural resources ("the regulatory gap"); and (iii) how has the Commission used other instruments, particularly competition law, to bridge the two gaps? The Introduction presents the institutional economics approach that guides the reader throughout the Thesis. It builds upon Williamson's four levels of institutional analysis and argues that the way in which access to natural resources is structured ("level 2" of institutional analysis), deeply impacts the regulatory design of the network industries and the way in which the Commission shapes the application of competition law. Its purpose is not to present an ideal system of resource management but rather to highlight that all institutional decisions bear costs, and that, in the absence of level 2 interventions, the Commission has used imperfect alternative solutions, such as competition law, to bridge the regulatory and power gaps.