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dc.contributor.authorSCHLAG, Karl H.en
dc.contributor.authorBALKENBORG, Dieteren
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Theory, 2007, 131, 1, 295-315en
dc.description.abstractIt is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combination is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. We use an extension of the notion of a strict Nash equilibrium to sets of strategy combinations called ‘strict equilibrium set’ and show the following. For a large class of evolutionary dynamics, including all monotone regular selection dynamics, every asymptotically stable set of rest points that contains a pure strategy combination in each of its connected components is a strict equilibrium set. A converse statement holds for two-person games, for convex sets and for the standard replicator dynamic.en
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Theory
dc.titleOn the Evolutionary Selection of Sets of Nash Equilibriaen
dc.neeo.contributorSCHLAG|Karl H.|aut|

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