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Power in international tax policy : the preconditions and redistributive consequences of credible sanction threats
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Florence : European University Institute, 2016
EUI; SPS; PhD Thesis
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HAKELBERG, Lukas, Power in international tax policy : the preconditions and redistributive consequences of credible sanction threats, Florence : European University Institute, 2016, EUI, SPS, PhD Thesis - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/44147
Abstract
International cooperation against tax evasion has had a long history of failure. Tax havens protecting the income and identities of their foreign clients through financial secrecy have persistently resisted requests from major developed economies for administrative assistance. Since 2014, however, more than 100 countries, including all major offshore centers, have agreed to automatically exchange information (AEI) on capital income earned by non-residents. Why did tax havens adopt AEI after decades of firm resistance against greater financial transparency? Conventional theories of tax cooperation do not provide an answer. Contractualist approaches expect international agreements to produce joint gains. Yet, countries substituting financial secrecy for the routine reporting of account information lose relative to the status quo ante, as hidden capital flows out, and wage levels and employment decline. Constructivist approaches expect shared regulative norms of sovereignty and nonintervention to prevent major economies from using coercion against noncooperative tax havens. In contrast, I trace tax haven cooperation in multilateral AEI back to a credible threat of economic sanctions from the United States (US). The US the only great power in tax matters for the time being linked access to its financial market to tax haven participation in bilateral AEI. This, in turn, provided the rest of the world with an opportunity to request cooperation in multilateral AEI from them. By comparing three anti-tax haven initiatives of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), I show, moreover, that the US only issues such a sanctions threat when it can shift the costs of regulation to foreign actors, and domestic constraints prevent regressive tax reform. Finally, a nested differences-in-differences analysis reveals that a credible sanctions threat reduces the value of foreign asset holdings in tax havens relative to non-havens.
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Defence date: 14 November 2016
Examining Board: Professor Adrienne Héritier, EUI/Supervisor; Professor Philipp Genschel, EUI/Co-Supervisor; Professor Eric Helleiner, University of Waterloo; Professor Thomas Rixen, University of Bamberg
Examining Board: Professor Adrienne Héritier, EUI/Supervisor; Professor Philipp Genschel, EUI/Co-Supervisor; Professor Eric Helleiner, University of Waterloo; Professor Thomas Rixen, University of Bamberg
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Section 7.3 ‘FATCA’s impact on international tax policy' and 7.4 'The lack of reciprocity from the United States' of the PhD thesis draw upon an earlier version published as an article 'The power politics of international tax co-operation : Luxembourg, Austria and the automatic exchange of information' (2015) in the journal ‘Journal of European public policy’
Chapter 1 'Introduction and overview' and 3 'Redistributive tax cooperation' of the PhD thesis draw upon an earlier version published as an article 'Coercion in international tax cooperation : identifying the prerequisites for sanction threats by a great power' (2016) in the journal ‘Review of international political economy’
Chapter 1 'Introduction and overview' and 3 'Redistributive tax cooperation' of the PhD thesis draw upon an earlier version published as an article 'Coercion in international tax cooperation : identifying the prerequisites for sanction threats by a great power' (2016) in the journal ‘Review of international political economy’