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dc.contributor.authorFEIS, Guglielmo
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-10T16:34:54Z
dc.date.available2017-04-10T16:34:54Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationEuropean journal of legal studies, 2017, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 37-52en
dc.identifier.issn1973-2937
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/46067
dc.description.abstractThe paper tackles Ought Implies Can (OIC) from a slightly different angle compared to the one that is often adopted in the contemporary OIC sub-debates. I am mainly concerned with the thought according to which, even if the action we ought to do is impossible, it is still possible to intend to do it. This possibility of intending is used as a strategy to rescue OIC from possible counter-examples. I explore two different ways to rescue the principle: (i) OIC rescue by implicating intending in action and (ii) OIC rescue by separation, and show they both face problems.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Instituteen
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean journal of legal studiesen
dc.relation.urihttps://ejls.eui.eu/en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.titleOught implies can : counter-examples and intentionsen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.volume9en
dc.identifier.startpage37en
dc.identifier.endpage52en
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue2en


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