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dc.contributor.authorPRAM, Kym
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-08T14:45:13Z
dc.date.available2017-06-08T14:45:13Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.issn1830-7728
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/46689
dc.description.abstractI consider environments in which an agent with private information can acquire arbitrary hard evidence about his type before interacting with a principal. In a broad class of screening models, I show that there is always an evidence structure that interim Pareto improves over the no-evidence benchmark whenever some types of the agent take an outside option in the benchmark case, and additional weak conditions, including either a single-crossing condition or state-independence of the principal's payoffs, are satisfied. I show that the sufficient conditions are tight and broadly applicable. Addressing concerns about multiple equilibria, I show how a planner can restrict the available evidence to ensure that an equilibrium which interim Pareto-improves over the benchmark case is obtained. Furthermore, I show that Pareto-improving evidence can arise endogenously when agents choose what evidence to acquire (and disclose).en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2017/10en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectInformation economicsen
dc.subjectHard evidenceen
dc.subjectMechanism designen
dc.subjectMicroeconomic theoryen
dc.subjectInsuranceen
dc.titleHard evidence and welfare in adverse selection environmentsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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