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dc.contributor.authorSUZUKI, Akisato
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-21T08:27:36Z
dc.date.available2017-12-21T08:27:36Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationInternational politics, 2019, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 70-86en
dc.identifier.issn1384-5748
dc.identifier.issn1740-3898
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/49624
dc.descriptionFirst Online: 13 December 2017en
dc.description.abstractWhy did Pakistan initiate the Kargil War with India, so soon after the two states reached overt nuclear status? Existing theories attribute war between nuclear states either to the strategic opportunities of limited conflict or to a closing opportunity of preventive war to destroy the nuclear capabilities of nuclearizing states. However, strategic opportunities explain the possibility of, but not the motivation for, war; after all, the nuclearization of India began long before the war. To develop a better explanation, I propose an original theory of how the theoretical mechanisms of nuclear deterrence can be altered by nationalist conflict. The Indo-Pakistani nationalist conflict not only motivated Pakistan to initiate the war because of its perception of a threat, but also caused both states to overestimate their own deterrence credibility and underestimate the other’s capability and resolve to conduct war. These nationalist motivations and estimations enabled the war between the two nuclear states. The article suggests that nuclear weapons may have different effects on different types of conflict.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherPalgrave Macmillanen
dc.relation.ispartofInternational politicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseries[Europe in the World]en
dc.relation.ispartofseries[Global Governance Programme]en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectNuclear weapons
dc.subjectDeterrence
dc.subjectNationalism
dc.subjectKargil
dc.subjectIndia
dc.subjectPakistan
dc.subject.otherInternational relations
dc.subject.otherNationalism
dc.titleThe nationalist interpretation of nuclear deterrence : evidence from the Kargil Waren
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1057/s41311-017-0117-x
dc.identifier.volume56
dc.identifier.startpage1en
dc.identifier.startpage70
dc.identifier.endpage17en
dc.identifier.endpage86
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