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dc.contributor.editorGRUNDMANN, Stefan
dc.contributor.editorMONTI, Giorgio
dc.contributor.editorPETIT, Christy Ann
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-16T15:57:27Z
dc.date.available2018-01-16T15:57:27Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationSpecial issue of European business organization law review, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 3en
dc.identifier.issn1566-7529
dc.identifier.issn1741-6205
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/50224
dc.description.abstractThe European Banking Union is complex—and arguably more complex than the other two paradigms of full integration—for at least three reasons. Firstly, the basis of its operation is formed only in part by the EU Treaties and in (larger) part by EU secondary legislation, contested in part, and not leaving complete freedom of design. Hence, it constitutes a somehow ‘twisted’ regime, standing on a somehow ‘shaky’ basis. Secondly, the European Banking Union consists of several pillars. While the discussions in the papers would probably have been more compact if the focus had been solely on the ongoing supervision by the European Central Bank (ECB, Frankfurt), the current supervision of banks as a going concern, within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), at least a second pillar could not possibly be left aside. It does seem to be so closely connected to the first pillar and so important also in the legal discussion and legal practice that it had to be included. This is the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), with the Single Resolution Board (SRB, Brussels) serving as the central agency/institution. Thirdly, the European Banking Union is complex because it by no means constitutes a fully centralized regime—probably much less than competition law was originally (today, of course, also more decentralized) and certainly much less than the European Monetary Union both of which were based on provisions in the Treaties.en
dc.description.tableofcontents-- Editorial, Stefan Grundmann, Giorgio Monti… Pages 391-399 -- The Banking Union and National Authorities 2 years down the Line—Some Observations from Germany, Jens-Hinrich Binder Pages 401-420 -- Inside Perspective: The ACPR’s View on the Operational Functioning of the Banking Union, Edouard Fernandez-Bollo Pages 421-430 -- Challenges to an Efficient European Centralised Banking Supervision (SSM): Single Rulebook, Joint Supervisory Teams and Split Supervisory Tasks, Laura Wissink Pages 431-456 -- Ending Too-Big-To-Fail: Progress Since the Crisis, the Importance of Loss-Absorbing Capacity and the UK Approach to Resolution, Peter G. Brierley Pages 457-477 -- Safeguarding the Stability of the Greek Banking System Amidst the Fiscal Crisis in the Euro Area: Arrangements Before and After the Establishment of the European Banking Union, Christos V. Gortsos Pages 479-502 -- The Myth of Cypriot Bank Resolution ‘Success’: A Plea for a More Holistic and Less Costly Supervision & Resolution Approach, Mikaella Yiatrou Pages 503-533 -- The Legal History of the Banking Union, Pedro Gustavo Teixeira Pages 535-565 -- The Administrative Board of Review of the European Central Bank: Experience After 2 Years, Concetta Brescia Morra, René Smits… Pages 567-589 -- De/centralized Decision Making Under the European Resolution Framework: Does Meroni Hamper the Creation of a European Resolution Authority?, Pamela Lintneren
dc.language.isoenen
dc.titleThe European Banking Union in actionen
dc.typeBooken


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