Date: 1997
Type: Thesis
Three essays in competitive bidding
Florence : European University Institute, 1997, EUI, ECO, PhD Thesis
PEZANIS-CHRISTOU, Paul, Three essays in competitive bidding, Florence : European University Institute, 1997, EUI, ECO, PhD Thesis - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/5040
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
Auction markets are one of the oldest price fixing mechanisms. Cassady (1967) reports examples of transactions that were conducted by auction which go back to 500 BC. Yet, despite their long and widespread use, these selling procedures became of interest to economists only quite recently. The literature on the theory of auctions is usually thought of as stemming from Vickrey’s (1961) seminal paper, where attention was focussed on four auction institutions: the First-Price sealed bid, the Second-Price sealed bid, the English and the Dutch auctions. In sealed bid auctions, the auctioneer asks buyers to submit sealed bids and awards the commodity to the highest bidder for a price equal to his bid if it is a First-Price auction or to the second highest bid if it is a Second-Price auction. In a Dutch (or descending price) auction, the bidding starts at a high opening price and is lowered by a clock device in increments until one of the bidders accepts the last price offer. In an (oral) English auction, the auctioneer calls for increasing offers and awards the item to the highest remaining bidder. From a buyer’s standpoint, the mere act of bidding represents an attempt to maximise a payoff which is usually measured as the difference between the value the item represents to him and the price he will have to pay in case he wins. By considering these auctions as bidding games and by analysing their strategic forms, Vickrey stated the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET): these four selling institutions yield the same expected revenue to the seller.
Table of Contents:
-- Sequential auctions with supply uncertainty
-- Sequential auctions with heterogenous buyers : an empirical study
-- On the impact of low balling : experimental results in asymmetric auctions
Additional information:
Defence date: 23 June 1997; Examining board: Prof. Louis-André Gérard-Varet, GREQAM, Marseille ; Prof. Ronald Harstad, Rutgers University, New Brunswick ; Prof. Alan Kirman, GREQAM, Marseille, Supervisor ; Prof. Louis Phlips, EUI; PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017; First made available in Open Access: 25 June 2024
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/5040
Full-text via DOI: 10.2870/76233
Series/Number: EUI; ECO; PhD Thesis
Publisher: European University Institute
LC Subject Heading: Letting of contracts
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