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dc.contributor.authorTRILLAS, Francescen
dc.date.accessioned2006-06-09T08:32:21Z
dc.date.available2006-06-09T08:32:21Z
dc.date.issued2000en
dc.identifier.citationFlorence : European University Institute, 2000
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/5085
dc.descriptionDefence date: 8 December 2000
dc.descriptionExamining Board: Vicente Salas (Chairman, University of Zaragoza) Ramón Marimón, (Ministry of Science and Technoclogy, Madrid / EUI, Co-supervisor) James Dow, (London Business School, Supervisor) Paul Grout (University of Bristol)
dc.descriptionFirst made available online 12 February 2019
dc.descriptionThe examining board indicated in the PDF and on the print version of the thesis ( Prof. Roger Farmer, UCLA and EUI ; Prof. Itzhak Gilboa, Tel Aviv University ; Prof. Alan Kirman, GREQAM. Marseille, Supervisor ; Prof. Avner Shaked, University of Bonn) are wrongly indicated
dc.description.abstractThe academic literature has developed a number of "standard prescriptions" for the privatization and regulation of utilities. The main purpose of this thesis is to qualify some of them, and build on the qualifications to find new insights. Although these prescriptions have not been endorsed universally, they permeate most of the theoretical and empirical work done in the recent past. In general, they constitute a benchmark that has enriched our understanding of the many economic issues related to the role and performance of privatized, regulated firms. These standard prescriptions are broadly based on the British experience and some specific strands of economic theory. By and large, progress has been made in reforming countries using these standard prescriptions. But the British experience can today be complemented with the experience of other countries, and with new developments in several fields of economic theory. The evolution itself of the British privatized industries, interacting with the evolution of the political cycle in the U.K., also helps to give a more balanced and complex view of this field.
dc.description.tableofcontents1. Introduction 2. Regulating utilities with political constraints 3. The structure of corporate ownership in privatized utilities 4. The takeover of Enersis by Endesa : the control of privatized utilities
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI PhD thesesen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDepartment of Economicsen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subject.lcshPrivatization
dc.titlePrivatized utilities : regulatory reform and corporate controlen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.identifier.doi10.2870/252758
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