Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorCURTIN, Deirdre
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-30T17:18:44Z
dc.date.available2018-01-30T17:18:44Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationEuropean law journal, 2017, Vol. 23, No. 1-2, pp. 28-44en
dc.identifier.issn1351-5993
dc.identifier.issn1468-0386
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/50945
dc.descriptionVersion of Record online: 16 AUG 2017en
dc.description.abstractThe European Central Bank (ECB) emerged from the financial crisis not only as the institutional ‘winner’ but also as the most central — and powerful — supranational institution of our times. This article challenges the so-called ‘accountable independence’ of the ECB across the range of tasks it carries out. Citizens ‘see’ the ECB today especially for its role in promoting austerity and its involvement as part of the troika and otherwise in the economic decision making of troubled Member States. Far from ECB monetary policy heralding a ‘new democratic model’, the ECB today suffers from a clear deficit in democracy. In between the grandiose concept of ECB ‘independence’ and the more performative ECB ‘accountability’ lies ‘transparency’. Across the range of ECB practices there is a need to take the related concepts of ‘transparency’ and of (democratic) ‘accountability’ more seriously, both in conceptual terms and in their relationship to one another.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherWileyen
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean law journalen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.title'Accountable independence' of the European Central Bank : seeing the logics of transparencyen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/eulj.12211
dc.identifier.volume23en
dc.identifier.startpage28en
dc.identifier.endpage44en
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue1-2en


Files associated with this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record