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dc.contributor.authorCRAMTON, Peter
dc.contributor.authorOCKENFELS, Axel
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-27T13:28:07Z
dc.date.available2018-02-27T13:28:07Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.citationEconomics journal, 2017, Vol. 127, No. 605, pp. 305-324en
dc.identifier.issn0013-0133
dc.identifier.issn1468-0297
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/51964
dc.descriptionFirst published: 24 October 2017. Creative Commonsen
dc.description.abstractThe 2010 German 4G spectrum auction was an unusually large simultaneous ascending multi-band auction. The bidding was competitive, the final assignment was efficient and the revenue was close to expectations. However, our analysis suggests that, theoretically, independent and rational bidders had an opportunity to implicitly coordinate on a low-revenue outcome. Coordination was difficult, though, because of a multiplicity of focal points. One important focal point involved post-auction negotiations, posing risks to bidders and the auctioneer. We analyze different bidding scenarios and in particular how post-auction negotiations can affect values, bidding and efficiency. We also briefly discuss how the simultaneous ascending auction format can be augmented to mitigate the risks implied by the possibility of strategic play.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics journalen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.titleThe German 4G spectrum auction : design and behavioren
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/ecoj.12406
dc.identifier.volume127en
dc.identifier.startpage305en
dc.identifier.endpage324en
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue605en


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