dc.contributor.author | MALAMUD, Andres | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-04-23T09:36:43Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-04-23T09:36:43Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Latin American research review, 2005, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 138-164 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0023-8791 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1542-4278 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/53584 | |
dc.description | Published under Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0. The article was downloaded under these CC 4.0 conditions from the publisher's past issue archive MUSE. | en |
dc.description.abstract | It is commonplace to assert that the effective operation of Mercosur rests deeply on presidential diplomacy. Such a mechanism is understood as the usual resort to direct negotiations between the national presidents every time a crucial decision needs to be made or a critical conflict has to be solved. This paper argues that presidential diplomacy, understood as political, summit diplomacy –as opposed to bureaucratic, professional diplomacy— is not enough to account for Mercosur actual proceedings and results. Through the empirical analysis of three critical junctures of Mercosur history, a framework is thus advanced to show how long-neglected institutional incentives and constraints, defined by national executive format, have impacted upon the process of regional integration. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | Latin American research review | en |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://hdl.handle.net/1814/5295 | |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
dc.title | Presidential diplomacy and the institutional underpinnings of Mercosur : an empirical examination | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1353/lar.2005.0004 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 40 | en |
dc.identifier.startpage | 138 | en |
dc.identifier.endpage | 164 | en |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en |
dc.description.version | Is partly based on author's EUI PhD thesis, 2003 | |