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dc.contributor.authorLAÏDI, Zaki
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-02T13:51:11Z
dc.date.available2018-08-02T13:51:11Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn1830-1541
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/57564
dc.description.abstractSince Trump’s election, multipolarity seems to be inducing an abatement of multilateralism. Why? This paper intends to explain this paradox by applying Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action to Trump’s Trade Policy. Olson predicted that in a social game in which the number of actors increases significantly, dominant actors dispose of two main resources to limit the number of free riders: rewards and coercion. By applying this hypothesis to Trump’s trade policy, it becomes clear that Trump wants to reduce the rewards offered to his partners, as he deems them excessive. Furthermore, he considers that the rules and norms of the world trading system limit the United States’ ability to coerce its partners. For this reason, the aim of Trump’s trade policy is to unbind the United States from the constraints of the multilateral trade system.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCAS PPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2018/02en
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGlobal Governance Programmeen
dc.relation.ispartofseries[Global Economics]en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectMultipolarityen
dc.subjectMultilateralismen
dc.subjectTradeen
dc.subjectTrumpen
dc.subjectEuropeen
dc.subject.otherInternational relations
dc.subject.otherTrade, investment and international cooperation
dc.titleReading Olson to understand Trump: multipolarity without multilateralism?en
dc.typeOtheren


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