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dc.contributor.authorTESCHE, Tobias
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-30T13:32:49Z
dc.date.available2020-02-29T03:45:15Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationJournal of European integration, 2019, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 447-463en
dc.identifier.issn0703-6337
dc.identifier.issn1477-2280
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/58065
dc.descriptionPublished online: 29 Aug 2018en
dc.description.abstractThis article shows that the quasi-fiscal nature of the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy measures and its troika membership created three mutually reinforcing threats to its political independence. First, it led to a rising level of public distrust in the ECB. Second, it triggered an elite dissensus on whether political independence of central banks was still the appropriate solution to the time inconsistency problem. Third, it created institutional overburdening with negative repercussions for the central bank’s output legitimacy. Faced with this diverse set of challenges in creditor and debtor countries, the ECB exploited EMU’s democratic deficit by relying on visits to national parliaments to preserve its independence.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis (Routledge)en
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of European integrationen
dc.relation.isreplacedbyhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/62526
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectEuropean Central Banken
dc.subjectAccountabilityen
dc.subjectEuro areaen
dc.subjectCentral bank independenceen
dc.subjectMonetary policyen
dc.titleInstrumentalizing EMU’s democratic deficit : the ECB’s unconventional accountability measures during the eurozone crisisen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/07036337.2018.1513498
dc.identifier.volume41
dc.identifier.startpage447
dc.identifier.endpage463
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue4
dc.embargo.terms2020-02-29


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