dc.contributor.author | KROL, Leendert Jan Gerrit | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-28T13:14:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-11-28T13:14:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
dc.identifier.citation | East European politics, 2017, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 450-471 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2159-9165 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2159-9173 | EN |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/59766 | |
dc.description | Published online: 27 Jul 2017 | |
dc.description.abstract | Authoritarian governments remain in power much longer when they distribute benefits to their supporters in an institutionalised way. Permitting parliament to fulfil a legislative function is an important strategy for autocrats to obtain long-lasting support from their allies. Political parties play an important role in this process - while having strong influence on the behaviour of MPs, empirical evidence from the Russian State Duma suggests that loyalty is rewarded with support for the legislative proposals of individual members. Amendments to government bills are high in quantity and often substantially significant. Legislative performance is, however, mostly limited to the United Russia party. | |
dc.publisher | Routledge | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | East European politics | |
dc.title | Legislative performance of the Russian State Duma : the role of parliament in an authoritarian regime | |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/21599165.2017.1346504 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 33 | |
dc.identifier.startpage | 450 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 471 | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | |