Pragmatic maxims and presumptions in legal interpretation
Title: Pragmatic maxims and presumptions in legal interpretation
Citation: Law and philosophy, 2018, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 69-115
ISSN: 0167-5249; 1573-0522
The fields of linguistic pragmatics and legal interpretation are deeply interrelated. The purpose of this paper is to show how pragmatics and the developments in argumentation theory can contribute to the debate on legal interpretation. The relation between the pragmatic maxims and the presumptions underlying the legal canons are brought to light, unveiling the principles that underlie the types of argument usually used to justify a construction. The Gricean maxims and the arguments of legal interpretation are regarded as presumptions subject to default used to justify an interpretation. This approach can allow one to trace the different legal interpretive arguments back to their basic underlying presumptions, so that they can be compared, ordered, and assessed according to their defeasibility conditions. This approach allows one to understand the difference between various types of interpretive canons, and their strength in justifying an interpretation.
Subject: Statutory interpretation; Law; Language; Truth
First online: 10 June 2017
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