Economic shocks and the cost of ruling : evidence from Italy
Journal of elections, public opinion and parties, 2020, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 22-41[POLCON]
MALET, Giorgio, KRIESI, Hanspeter, Economic shocks and the cost of ruling : evidence from Italy, Journal of elections, public opinion and parties, 2020, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 22-41[POLCON] - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/60934
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
Do voters punish governments more severely during international economic crises or do they discount exogenous shocks as they recognize the government’s limited “room of manoeuvre”? The current literature provides conﬂicting answers to this question. This study argues that in such contexts citizens’ economic perceptions are less likely to predict their sanctioning behavior but that, nonetheless, governments experience a higher cost of ruling. We show that in the paradigmatic case of Italy, government popularity during the Great Recession, while being hardly explained by economic evaluations, suﬀers a stronger decline as a function of time in oﬃce. We account for this increased cost of ruling by economic policy debates and other political events, such as cabinet crises and large-scale scandals.
Published online: 24 January 2019
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/60934
Full-text via DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2019.1571496
ISSN: 1745-7289; 1745-7297; 1
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
Grant number: FP7/338875/EU
Sponsorship and Funder information:
ERC POLCON project funded.
Files associated with this item
- Malet Kriesi_Italy_JEPOP2019.pdf
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