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dc.contributor.authorMALET, Giorgio
dc.contributor.authorKRIESI, Hanspeter
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-07T13:10:11Z
dc.date.available2019-02-07T13:10:11Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationJournal of elections, public opinion and parties, 2020, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 22-41en
dc.identifier.issn1745-7289
dc.identifier.issn1745-7297
dc.identifier.issn1
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/60934
dc.descriptionPublished online: 24 January 2019en
dc.description.abstractDo voters punish governments more severely during international economic crises or do they discount exogenous shocks as they recognize the government’s limited “room of manoeuvre”? The current literature provides conflicting answers to this question. This study argues that in such contexts citizens’ economic perceptions are less likely to predict their sanctioning behavior but that, nonetheless, governments experience a higher cost of ruling. We show that in the paradigmatic case of Italy, government popularity during the Great Recession, while being hardly explained by economic evaluations, suffers a stronger decline as a function of time in office. We account for this increased cost of ruling by economic policy debates and other political events, such as cabinet crises and large-scale scandals.en
dc.description.sponsorshipERC POLCON project funded.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis (Routledge)
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/338875/EU
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of elections, public opinion and partiesen
dc.relation.ispartofseries[POLCON]en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.titleEconomic shocks and the cost of ruling : evidence from Italyen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/17457289.2019.1571496
dc.identifier.volume30
dc.identifier.startpage22
dc.identifier.endpage41


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