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dc.contributor.authorLEVINE, David K.
dc.contributor.authorMODICA, Salvatore
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-01T14:53:11Z
dc.date.available2019-03-01T14:53:11Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationTheoretical economics, 2016, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 89-131
dc.identifier.issn1933-6837
dc.identifier.issn1555-7561en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/61436
dc.descriptionFirst published: 01 February 2016
dc.description.abstractWe characterize transitions between stochastically stable states and relative ergodic probabilities in the theory of the evolution of conventions. We give an application to the fall of hegemonies in the evolutionary theory of institutions and conflict, and illustrate the theory with the fall of the Qing dynasty and the rise of communism in China.
dc.description.sponsorshipWe are especially indebted to Juan Block for his many comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank Drew Fudenberg, Kevin Hasker, Matt Jackson, Peyton Young, and five anonymous referees. We are grateful to NSF Grant SES-08-51315 and to the MIUR PRIN 20103S5RN3 for financial support.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherEconometric Societyen
dc.relation.ispartofTheoretical economics
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
dc.subjectLaw
dc.subjectPractices
dc.subjectPragmatism
dc.subjectEquilibrium Selectionen
dc.titleDynamics in stochastic evolutionary models
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/TE1978
dc.identifier.volume11
dc.identifier.startpage89
dc.identifier.endpage131
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dc.identifier.issue1


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