The global carbon budget : a conflicting claims problem
Climatic change, 2016, Vol. 136, No. 3-4, pp. 693-703
GIMENEZ-GOMEZ, Jose-Manuel, TEIXIDO-FIGUERAS, Jordi, VILELLA, Cori, The global carbon budget : a conflicting claims problem, Climatic change, 2016, Vol. 136, No. 3-4, pp. 693-703 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/61487
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
An effective climate agreement is urgently required, yet conflict between parties prevails over cooperation. Thanks to advances in science it is now possible to quantify the global carbon budget, the amount of available cumulative CO2 emissions before crossing the 2 C-a similar to threshold (Meinshausen et al. Nature 458(7242):1158-1162, 2009). Countries carbon claims, however, exceed this. Historically such situations have been tackled with bankruptcy division rules. We argue that framing climate negotiations as a classical conflicting claims problem (O'Neill Math Soc Sci 2(4):345-371, 1982) may provide for an effective climate policy. We analyze the allocation of the global carbon budget among parties claiming the maximum emissions rights possible. Based on the selection of some desirable principles, we propose an efficient and sustainable allocation of the available carbon budget for the period 2000 to 2050 taking into account different risk scenarios.
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/61487
Full-text via DOI: 10.1007/s10584-016-1633-1
ISSN: 0165-0009; 1573-1480
Keyword(s): Emissions Agreements Talmud Game
Sponsorship and Funder information:Generalitat de CatalunyaMinisterio de Economia y Competitividad
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