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dc.contributor.authorGENSCHEL, Philipp
dc.contributor.authorLIERSE, Hanna
dc.contributor.authorSEELKOPF, Laura
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-01T14:53:42Z
dc.date.available2019-03-01T14:53:42Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationReview of international political economy, 2016, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 290-315
dc.identifier.issn0969-2290
dc.identifier.issn1466-4526en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/61497
dc.description.abstractIt pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic, more than a third of countries worldwide are non-democratic. We explain theoretically why autocracies are less likely to adjust to competitive constraints and test our argument empirically against data on the corporate tax policy of 99 countries from 1999 to 2011.
dc.description.sponsorshipGerman Science Foundation via the Collaborative Research Center [597]
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis (Routledge)en
dc.relation597
dc.relation.ispartofReview of international political economy
dc.subjectAutocracy
dc.subjectDemocracy
dc.subjectGlobalization
dc.subjectTax Competition
dc.subjectCorporate taxation
dc.subjectTax policy-making
dc.subjectForeign Direct-Investmenten
dc.subjectPolitical-Institutionsen
dc.subjectDeveloping-Countriesen
dc.subjectCapital Taxationen
dc.subjectCivil-Waren
dc.subjectPolicyen
dc.subjectGlobalizationen
dc.subjectRegimesen
dc.subjectAuthoritarianismen
dc.subjectExpropriationen
dc.titleDictators don't compete : autocracy, democracy, and tax competition
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/09692290.2016.1152995
dc.identifier.volume23
dc.identifier.startpage290
dc.identifier.endpage315
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dc.identifier.issue2


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