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dc.contributor.authorLEVINE, David K.
dc.contributor.authorMODICA, Salvatore
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-01T14:53:45Z
dc.date.available2019-03-01T14:53:45Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationJournal of economic behavior & organization, 2016, Vol. 123, pp. 19-30
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.issn1879-1751en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/61504
dc.description.abstractWe investigate how a collusive group can sustain non-Nash actions by enforcing internal discipline through costly peer punishment. We give a simple and tractable characterization of schemes that minimize discipline costs while preserving incentive compatibility. We apply the model to a public goods contribution problem. We find that if the per-capita benefit from the public good is low, then regardless of whether peer discipline is feasible or not only small groups will contribute to the good. If the public good benefit is significant but peer discipline is infeasible it remains the case that only small groups contribute. On the other hand, if the public good benefit is significant but peer discipline is feasible then full contribution takes place regardless of group size. We reconcile this result with Olson's idea that small groups are more effective by considering the case where the per-capita benefit of the public good varies with group size. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relationSES-08-51315
dc.relation20103S5RN3
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of economic behavior & organization
dc.subjectGroup incentives
dc.subjectPeer discipline
dc.subjectOrganization
dc.subjectGroup
dc.subjectGroup-Sizeen
dc.subjectCooperationen
dc.subjectInformationen
dc.titlePeer discipline and incentives within groups
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2015.12.006
dc.identifier.volume123
dc.identifier.startpage19
dc.identifier.endpage30
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