Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorGILLI, Andrea
dc.contributor.authorGILLI, Mauro
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-27T10:56:31Z
dc.date.available2019-05-27T10:56:31Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationInternational security, 2018, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 141-189en
dc.identifier.issn0162-2889
dc.identifier.issn1531-4804
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/62986
dc.description.abstractCan countries easily imitate the United States' advanced weapon systems and thus erode its military-technological superiority? Scholarship in international relations theory generally assumes that rising states benefit from the “advantage of backwardness.” That is, by free riding on the research and technology of the most advanced countries, less developed states can allegedly close the military-technological gap with their rivals relatively easily and quickly. More recent works maintain that globalization, the emergence of dual-use components, and advances in communications have facilitated this process. This literature is built on shaky theoretical foundations, however, and its claims lack empirical support. In particular, it largely ignores one of the most important changes to have occurred in the realm of weapons development since the second industrial revolution: the exponential increase in the complexity of military technology. This increase in complexity has promoted a change in the system of production that has made the imitation and replication of the performance of state-of-the-art weapon systems harder—so much so as to offset the diffusing effects of globalization and advances in communications. An examination of the British-German naval rivalry (1890–1915) and China's efforts to imitate U.S. stealth fighters supports these findings.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technology Press (MIT Press)en
dc.relation.ispartofInternational securityen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.titleWhy China has not caught up yet : military-technological superiority and the limits of imitation, reverse engineering, and cyber espionageen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1162/isec_a_00337
dc.identifier.volume43en
dc.identifier.startpage141en
dc.identifier.endpage189en
dc.identifier.issue3en
dc.rights.licenseCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)


Files associated with this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)