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dc.contributor.authorHALMAI, Gábor
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-13T10:10:17Z
dc.date.available2019-11-13T10:10:17Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.issn1725-6739
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/64967
dc.description.abstractIn the paper I try to answer the question, whether there is a genuine constitutional theory of ‘illiberal constitutionalism,’ recently advocated in some East-Central European member states of the European Union, especially in Hungary and Poland. As I demonstrate, court ideologists of populist autocrats use Carl Schmitt’s concept of political sovereignty and collective identity of the people, or misuse Max Weber’s leader democracy or Richard Bellamy’s or others’ political constitutionalism ideas to legitimize authoritarian aims. I argue that the constitutional concept, which rejects liberalism as a constitutive precondition of democracy, cannot be in compliance with the traditional idea of liberal democratic constitutionalism. This concept has nothing to do with any majoritarian constitutional model based on the separation of power, or with political constitutionalism, or any kind of weak judicial review, and it misuses the concept of constitutional identity. One of the reasons of the illiberal turn has been that there was a lack of consensus about liberal democratic values at the time of the transition. In the beginning of the democratic transitions in these new democracies, preference was given to general economic effectiveness over mass civic and political engagement. According to some authors, the prospects for liberal constitutional democracy in the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe following the 1989–90 transition were diminished by a technocratic, judicial control of politics, which blunted the development of civic constitutionalism, civil society, and participatory democratic government as necessary counterpoints to the technocratic machinery of legal constitutionalism. But, there is nothing to suggest that an earlier and more participatory constitution-making process would have prevented the populist turn. Those proponents of participatory constitutionalism do not sufficiently take into account the rise of populism and the lack of civic interest in constitutional matters, due to poor constitutional culture. The recent success of illiberalism in the region seems to indicate that the special historical circumstances require a longer period of time the build up a liberal democratic political and constitutional culture. But the democratic backsliding is not a proof of the failure of liberal democracy altogether, as illiberal leaders and their court ideologists want people to believe.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Instituteen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI LAWen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2019/05en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectConstitutionalismen
dc.subjectEast-Central Europeen
dc.subjectIlliberalismen
dc.subjectAuthoritarianismen
dc.subjectConstitutional identityen
dc.titleIlliberalism in East-Central Europeen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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