dc.contributor.author | NELKEN, David | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2003-07-01T07:36:46Z | |
dc.date.available | 2003-07-01T07:36:46Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1990 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/64 | |
dc.description | First made available online on 4 November 2019 | |
dc.description | First made available online on 4 November 2019 | en |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper I want to discuss some issues arising from clashes or apparent clashes between legal and scientific conceptions of reality and methods of truth-finding. The topics which will be considered include: Can there be different truths for law and science? How can we make sense of them? Is it possible to choose between them? I shall begin by providing some historical and intellectual background with reference to recent developments concerning the challenge of post-positivist arguments in the philosophy and sociology of law. I shall then analyse the different standpoints from which disputes between law and science may be examined and consider in detail efforts to develop a new approach to handling such clashes. I will conclude by illustrating the relevance of these theoretical considerations to two current controversies in criminal law and criminal procedure. | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | European University Institute | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI LAW | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 1990/01 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
dc.title | The truth about law's truth | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |