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dc.contributor.authorNELKEN, David
dc.date.accessioned2003-07-01T07:36:46Z
dc.date.available2003-07-01T07:36:46Z
dc.date.issued1990
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/64
dc.descriptionFirst made available online on 4 November 2019
dc.descriptionFirst made available online on 4 November 2019en
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I want to discuss some issues arising from clashes or apparent clashes between legal and scientific conceptions of reality and methods of truth-finding. The topics which will be considered include: Can there be different truths for law and science? How can we make sense of them? Is it possible to choose between them? I shall begin by providing some historical and intellectual background with reference to recent developments concerning the challenge of post-positivist arguments in the philosophy and sociology of law. I shall then analyse the different standpoints from which disputes between law and science may be examined and consider in detail efforts to develop a new approach to handling such clashes. I will conclude by illustrating the relevance of these theoretical considerations to two current controversies in criminal law and criminal procedure.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherEuropean University Institute
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI LAWen
dc.relation.ispartofseries1990/01en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.titleThe truth about law's truthen
dc.typeWorking Paper
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


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