Corruption, party leaders, and candidate selection : evidence from Italy

Abstract

Research indicates that voters are not particularly effective at removing corrupt politicians from office, in part because voters make decisions on the basis of many competing factors. Party leaders are much more single-minded than voters and will choose to deselect implicated legislators if it means maintaining a positive party reputation and improving the odds of winning a legislative majority. We examine renominations to Italy's legislature in two periods marked by corruption. We compare these renomination patterns with those from the prior legislature, when corruption lacked political salience. Our analysis shows that incumbent renominations are negatively associated with the number of press mentions that link the incumbent to corruption-but only when corruption is salient to the public. Our study highlights the importance of party leaders in forcing malfeasant legislators out of office-and reducing corruption-and redirects attention from voters to political elites as a critical channel in enforcing democratic accountability.