dc.contributor.author | CAMOUS, Antoine | |
dc.contributor.author | COOPER, Russell | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-02-10T16:07:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-02-10T16:07:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.identifier.citation | American economic journal-macroeconomics, 2019, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 38-81 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1945-7707 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1945-7715 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/66018 | |
dc.description | Available in October 2019 | en |
dc.description.abstract | The valuation of government debt is subject to strategic uncertainty. Pessimistic lenders, fearing default, bid down the price of debt, leaving a government with a higher debt burden. This increases the likelihood of default, thus confirming the pessimism of lenders. Can monetary interventions mitigate debt fragility? With one-period commitment to a state-contingent policy, the monetary authority can indeed overcome strategic uncertainty. Under discretion, debt-fragility remains unless reputation effects are sufficiently strong. Simpler forms of interventions, such as an inflation target, cannot eliminate debt fragility. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | Amer Economic Assoc | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | American economic journal-macroeconomics | en |
dc.title | 'Whatever it takes' is all you need : monetary policy and debt fragility | en |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1257/mac.20170167 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 11 | |
dc.identifier.startpage | 38 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 81 | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | |