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dc.contributor.authorGOVAERTS, Niels
dc.contributor.authorBRUNINX, Kenneth
dc.contributor.authorLE CADRE, Helene
dc.contributor.authorMEEUS, Leonardo
dc.contributor.authorDELARUE, Erik
dc.identifier.citationEnergy economics, 2019, Vol. 84, (Art. UNSP 104459), OnlineOnlyen
dc.identifier.otherUNSP 104459
dc.descriptionAvailable online 15 August 2019en
dc.description.abstractIn many countries, distribution grid tariffs are being reformed to adapt to the new realities of an electricity system with distributed energy resources. In Europe, legislative proposals have been made to harmonize these reforms across country borders. Many stakeholders have argued that distribution tariffs are a local affair, while the European institutions argued that there can be spillovers to other countries, which could justify a more harmonized approach. In this paper, we quantify these spillovers in a simplified numerical example to give insight and an order of magnitude. We look at different scenarios, and find that the spillovers can be both negative and positive. To be able to quantify these effects, we developed a long-run market equilibrium model that captures the wholesale market effects of distribution grid tariffs. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game involving consumers, generating companies and distribution system operators in a stylized electricity market. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en
dc.description.sponsorshipFlemish Institute for Technological Research (VITO)en
dc.relation.ispartofEnergy economicsen
dc.subjectDistribution grid tariff designen
dc.subjectDistributed energy resourcesen
dc.subjectNon-cooperative gameen
dc.subjectEnergy policyen
dc.titleSpillover effects of distribution grid tariffs in the internal electricity market : an argument for harmonization?en

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