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dc.contributor.authorTESCHE, Tobias
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-10T16:09:09Z
dc.date.available2021-04-16T02:45:39Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationJournal of contemporary European studies, 2020, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 114-127en
dc.identifier.issn1478-2804
dc.identifier.issn1478-2790
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/66119
dc.descriptionFirst published online: 16 October 2019en
dc.description.abstractThis article categorizes newly created and proposed Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) institutions according to a new typology that broadens the well-established agent-trustee distinction to include cooptation and orchestration as two additional modes of indirect governance. Four empirical cases from the realm of EMU governance are discussed, i.e. the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the European Central Bank (ECB), the proposed European Minister of Economics and Finance (EMEF) and the European Fiscal Board (EFB). Empirically, it shows that supranational actors like the European Commission can bypass states through enlisting existing authority to deepen European integration.en
dc.format.mimetypedc.format.mimetype
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherRoutledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltden
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of contemporary European studiesen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectEuropean integrationen
dc.subjectSupranationalismen
dc.subjectorchestrationen
dc.subjectindirect governanceen
dc.subjectEconomic and Monetary Unionen
dc.subject.otherCoFoEen
dc.subject.otherEconomyen
dc.titleSupranational agency and indirect governance after the euro crisis : ESM, ECB, EMEF and EFBen
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/14782804.2019.1677575
dc.identifier.volume28
dc.identifier.startpage114
dc.identifier.endpage127
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dc.identifier.issue1
dc.embargo.terms2021-04-16


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