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dc.contributor.authorVAN 'T KLOOSTER, Jens
dc.contributor.authorFONTAN, Clement
dc.identifier.citationNew political economy, 2020, Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 865-879en
dc.descriptionFirst published online: 23 August 2019en
dc.description.abstractMonetary policy operations in corporate security markets confront central banks with choices that are traditionally perceived to be the prerogative of governments. This article investigates how central bankers legitimise corporate security purchases through a comparative study of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB). As we show, central bankers downplay the novelty of corporate security purchases by relying on familiar pre-crisis justifications of Central Bank Independence. Citing an ideal of 'market neutrality', central banks present corporate security purchases as pursuing a narrow objective of price stability and obfuscate their distributive consequences. In this way, central bankers depoliticise corporate security purchases: they reduce the potential for choice, collective agency, and deliberation concerning both the pursuit of corporate security purchases and the choices made in implementing these policies. We also describe the undesirable democratic, social and environmental dimensions of these practices, which we propose to address through enhanced democratic accountability.en
dc.publisherRoutledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltden
dc.relation.ispartofNew political economyen
dc.subjectEuropean Central Banken
dc.subjectSwiss National Banken
dc.subjectQuantitative Easingen
dc.subjectMarket Neutralityen
dc.subjectCentral bank Independenceen
dc.titleThe myth of market neutrality : a comparative study of the European Central Bank's and the Swiss National Bank's corporate security purchasesen

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