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dc.contributor.authorMARIANI, Fabio
dc.date.accessioned2007-02-09T12:01:54Z
dc.date.available2007-02-09T12:01:54Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/6697
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides the first political economy model in which self-interested natives decide when voting rights should be granted to foreign-born workers. This choice is driven by the maximization of net gains from immigration. We focus on the provision of a public good: immigrants enlarge the tax base by increasing the total workforce, but at the same time they influence the tax rate by eventually exerting their political rights. We find that the quantity and the quality (human capital) of potential immigrants, the political composition and the age structure of the native population, and the sensitivity of the migration choice to voting rights, all are decisive factors in determining the political choice over the optimal timing of naturalizationen
dc.format.extent626153 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007/02en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectD72en
dc.subjectF22en
dc.subjectH2en
dc.subjectJ61en
dc.subjectImmigrationen
dc.subjectNaturalization policiesen
dc.subjectVotingen
dc.subjectPublic goodsen
dc.titleThe Political Economy of Immigrants' Naturalizationen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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