dc.contributor.author | MARIANI, Fabio | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-02-09T12:01:54Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-02-09T12:01:54Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1028-3625 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/6697 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper provides the first political economy model in which self-interested
natives decide when voting rights should be granted to foreign-born workers.
This choice is driven by the maximization of net gains from immigration. We
focus on the provision of a public good: immigrants enlarge the tax base by
increasing the total workforce, but at the same time they influence the tax rate
by eventually exerting their political rights. We find that the quantity and the
quality (human capital) of potential immigrants, the political composition and
the age structure of the native population, and the sensitivity of the migration
choice to voting rights, all are decisive factors in determining the political choice
over the optimal timing of naturalization | en |
dc.format.extent | 626153 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI RSCAS | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2007/02 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | D72 | en |
dc.subject | F22 | en |
dc.subject | H2 | en |
dc.subject | J61 | en |
dc.subject | Immigration | en |
dc.subject | Naturalization policies | en |
dc.subject | Voting | en |
dc.subject | Public goods | en |
dc.title | The Political Economy of Immigrants' Naturalization | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
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