The future of EU unemployment insurance : an ethical perspective

Abstract

Recently, there have been numerous calls for the development of an EU unemployment insurance policy (compare also the recent proposal for an instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency [SURE]). In the context of the Eurozone, the most common argument for such a policy is that it is an essential part of a monetary union: a monetary union without an accompanying fiscal union is inherently fragile. Professor Sangiovanni argues that such functionalist arguments rely on a set of implicit normative assumptions. Uncovering them allows us to ask: What is the best normative argument for an EU unemployment insurance scheme? Put another way: What does the often mentioned, but little understood, commitment to solidarity require of us as European citizens? He will outline what kind of EU unemployment insurance solidarity, properly understood, requires of us, putting forward a case for an EU-level instrument designed to reinsure member state schemes. He will also address whether, why, and to what extent such an unemployment scheme requires the EU to become a transfer union.