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dc.contributor.authorKARAGIANNIS, Yannis
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-03T14:05:26Z
dc.date.available2007-05-03T14:05:26Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.issn1028-3625
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/6790
dc.description.abstractEconomic theories are increasingly popular in political science, and in particular in research on the relations between the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches of government. Among these theories, principal-agent (´PA´) and transaction cost economics (´TCE´) feature particularly high in our research agenda. Yet, pushed by the view that “the content of ´science´ is primarily the methods and rules” (King et al. 1994: 9), and working with limited resources, political scientists have tended to neglect careful theorizing. PA and TCE are taken off-the-shelf without much prior scrutiny, and past conceptual mistakes are perpetuated. This paper aims at introducing and explaining the real PA, positive agency, TCE, and incomplete contracts theories for the purposes of political analysis. In a companion paper, I show the serious mistakes perpetuated by political scientists, and I argue that, faced with a choice between those four economic theories, we should place our bets on a revised version of TCE.en
dc.format.extent264493 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI RSCASen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007/16en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectTheory of delegationen
dc.subjectpolitical scienceen
dc.subjectPrincipal-agent modelsen
dc.subjectTransaction costs economicsen
dc.titleFoundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studiesen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
eui.subscribe.skiptrue


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