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dc.contributor.authorLEVINE, David K.
dc.contributor.authorMATTOZZI, Andrea
dc.contributor.authorMODICA, Salvatore
dc.date.accessioned2020-10-01T14:14:09Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationInternational economic review, 2021, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 47-64en
dc.identifier.issn0020-6598
dc.identifier.issn1468-2354
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/68436
dc.descriptionFirst published: 30 September 2020en
dc.description.abstractThe relevance of special interests lobbying in modern democracies can hardly be questioned. But if large trade associations can overcome the free riding problem and form effective lobbies, why do they not also threaten market competition by forming equally effective cartels? We argue that the key to understanding the difference lies in supply elasticity. The group discipline which works in the case of lobbying can be effective in sustaining a cartel only if increasing output is sufficiently costly ‐ otherwise the incentive to deviate is too great. The theory helps organizing a number of stylized facts within a common framework.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherWileyen
dc.relation.ispartofInternational economic reviewen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccessen
dc.titleTrade associations : why not cartels?en
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/iere.12487
dc.identifier.volume62en
dc.identifier.startpage47en
dc.identifier.endpage64en
eui.subscribe.skiptrue
dc.identifier.issue1en
dc.embargo.terms2022-09-30
dc.date.embargo2022-09-30
dc.description.versionThis article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may lead to differences between this version and the Version of Record.en


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