dc.contributor.author | VAN DER WEELE, Joel | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-06-11T15:24:51Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-06-11T15:24:51Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1725-6704 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/6866 | |
dc.description.abstract | We present a model of collective action in a heterogenous population of egoists and conditional cooperators. Each player is uncertain about the cooperative inclinations of the other player. A government or
principal who has information about the distribution of types may introduce sanctions for defection. We
study the impact of such sanctions through the e¤ect on the beliefs of the players about the distribution
of types they are facing. It is shown that in equilibrium sanctions can crowd out trust between agents by
sending a signal that there are many egoists around. This can lead the government to set low sanctions
to induce trust and 'crowd in' cooperation. In cases where conditional cooperation is an important factor
in collective action, as is the case in tax compliance, the model provides a rationale for the low observed
sanctions in the real world. | en |
dc.format.extent | 434201 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | European University Institute | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI ECO | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2007/10 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | Collective action | en |
dc.subject | trust | en |
dc.subject | incentives | en |
dc.subject | crowding out | en |
dc.subject | conditional cooperation | en |
dc.subject | D83 | en |
dc.subject | J30 | en |
dc.subject | K42 | en |
dc.subject | M52 | en |
dc.title | The Signalling Power of Sanctions in Collective Action Problems | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.neeo.contributor | VAN DER WEELE|Joel|aut| | |
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