Transnational Employer Lobbying when one Size does not fit all: Anglo-German Wrangles under the UNICE Umbrella, 1970-2003

Abstract

Transnational interest groups can lobby forcefully if and only if national member associations agree on a policy stance. This paper explores the conditions for transnational cohesion by examining German and British employer positions on EU company law directives from 1970 to 2003. Employers were divided over directives concerning shareholder rights but formed a united front against directives concerning worker participation. Why did cross-national differences in the status quo undermine cohesion within UNICE -the European peak employer federation- in one case but not in the other? I argue that “externality” considerations are part of the explanation. Employers consider not only whether they are better off if a directive applies in their own country, but also how it affects them that the same directive will apply abroad. In the takeover case, the externality effect was positive, undermining intra-class cohesion. In the worker participation case, with negative externality effects, class cohesion was reinforced.