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dc.contributor.authorCALLAGHAN, Helen
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-05T08:53:18Z
dc.date.available2007-07-05T08:53:18Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.issn1830-7728
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/6924
dc.description.abstractTransnational interest groups can lobby forcefully if and only if national member associations agree on a policy stance. This paper explores the conditions for transnational cohesion by examining German and British employer positions on EU company law directives from 1970 to 2003. Employers were divided over directives concerning shareholder rights but formed a united front against directives concerning worker participation. Why did cross-national differences in the status quo undermine cohesion within UNICE -the European peak employer federation- in one case but not in the other? I argue that “externality” considerations are part of the explanation. Employers consider not only whether they are better off if a directive applies in their own country, but also how it affects them that the same directive will apply abroad. In the takeover case, the externality effect was positive, undermining intra-class cohesion. In the worker participation case, with negative externality effects, class cohesion was reinforced.en
dc.format.extent212826 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUI MWPen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007/04en
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectInterest intermediationen
dc.subjectPreference formationen
dc.subjectEmployersen
dc.subjectLobbyingen
dc.subjectEuropeanizationen
dc.subjectCorporate governanceen
dc.subjectIndustrial relationsen
dc.subjectVarieties of Capitalismen
dc.titleTransnational Employer Lobbying when one Size does not fit all: Anglo-German Wrangles under the UNICE Umbrella, 1970-2003en
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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