Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorVAN LEEUWEN, Boris
dc.contributor.authorOFFERMAN, Theo
dc.contributor.authorSCHRAM, Arthur
dc.date.accessioned2020-12-18T13:31:11Z
dc.date.available2020-12-18T13:31:11Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationJournal of the European Economic Association, 2020, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 666–707en
dc.identifier.issn1542-4766
dc.identifier.issn1542-4774
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/69342
dc.descriptionPublished Online: 22 February 2019en
dc.description.abstractWe investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and exogenously monetarized status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for the concept of challenge-freeness, a refinement that predicts when a repeated game equilibrium will be played, and if so which one. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that these observations are driven by social preferences, independently of the competition for statusen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of the European Economic Associationen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.subjectC91en
dc.subjectD85en
dc.subjectH41en
dc.titleCompetition for status creates superstars : an experiment on public good provision and network formationen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/jeea/jvz001
dc.identifier.volume18en
dc.identifier.startpage666en
dc.identifier.endpage707en
dc.identifier.issue2en


Files associated with this item

Icon

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record