The demand-boost theory of exclusive dealing
Rand journal of economics, 2020, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 713-738
CALZOLARI, Giacomo, DENICOLÒ, Vincenzo, ZANCHETTI, Piercarlo, The demand-boost theory of exclusive dealing, Rand journal of economics, 2020, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 713-738 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/70064
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
This article unifies various approaches to the analysis of exclusive dealing that so far have been regarded as distinct. The common element of these approaches is that firms depart from efficient pricing, raising marginal prices above marginal costs. We show that with distorted prices, exclusive dealing can be directly profitable and anticompetitive provided that the dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over rivals. The dominant firm gains directly, rather than in the future, or in adjacent markets, thanks to the boost in demand it enjoys when buyers sign exclusive contracts. We discuss the implication of the theory for antitrust policy.
First published online: 24 August 2020
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/70064
Full-text via DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12338
ISSN: 0741-6261; 1756-2171
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