dc.contributor.author | SIEMS, Mathias | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-03-01T13:32:16Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-03-01T13:32:16Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.identifier.citation | American journal of comparative law, 2019, Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 861-888 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0002-919X | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2326-9197 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/70270 | |
dc.description | First published online: 31 December 2019 | en |
dc.description.abstract | What can comparative law compare? It is relatively uncontroversial that certain topics are included in its scope. For example, there is little doubt that any comparison between legal rules of different countries belongs to the field of comparative law. Beyond this traditional scope, some comparatists include further topics, for example, suggesting that legal systems of the past, subnational laws, and informal forms of dispute resolution can also be possible units of comparative law. But why stop here? As many legal topics involve elements of comparison, it may only be logical to make any comparison in law part of the field of comparative law. However, such a suggestion about the broadening of comparative law also needs to assess whether the methods and concepts of comparative law can be made suitable for non-conventional units. Therefore, this Article will discuss both the possible extensions to the scope of comparative law and the corresponding power of comparative law to deal with these new units of comparison. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.publisher | Oxford University Press | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | American journal of comparative law | en |
dc.title | The power of comparative law : what types of units can comparative law compare? | en |
dc.type | Article | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/ajcl/avz030 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 67 | |
dc.identifier.startpage | 861 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 888 | |
eui.subscribe.skip | true | |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | |