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dc.contributor.authorBOLLEYER, Nicoleen
dc.date.accessioned2007-08-30T12:49:22Z
dc.date.available2007-08-30T12:49:22Z
dc.date.created2007en
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationFlorence : European University Institute, 2007en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/7039
dc.descriptionDefence date: 7 May 2007
dc.descriptionExamining Board: Prof. Tanja A. Börzel (Free University of Berlin) ; Prof. Adrienne Héritier (European University Institute) ; Prof. Peter Mair (European University Institute) ; Prof. Alberta Sbragia (University of Pittsburgh)
dc.descriptionPDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD thesesen
dc.description.abstractOver the past decades, governments have increasingly been confronted with problems that transcend their boundaries. A multitude of policy fields are affected, including environment, trade and security. Responding to the challenges triggered by Europeanization and globalization, governments increasingly interact across different spheres of authority. Both theoretically and empirically, the puzzle of institutional choice reflected by the variety of arrangements in which intergovernmental cooperation takes place inside individual countries and across their borders remains surprisingly under-explored. In an attempt to solve this puzzle, the dissertation tackles the following questions: Why are the intergovernmental arrangements governments set up to deal with boundary-crossing problems so different? To what extent do these institutional differences affect the effectiveness of intergovernmental cooperation? To address this gap theoretically and empirically, this book adopts a deductive, rationalist approach to institution-building. It argues that internal politics, the type of executive-legislative relations within the interacting governments, explains the nature of institutions set up to channel intergovernmental processes: while power-sharing governments engage in institution-building, power-concentrating governments avoid it. It also shows that these institutional choices matter for the output of intergovernmental cooperation. The approach is applied to Canada, Switzerland, the United States, and finally the European Union. Disaggregating individual government units, the theoretical approach reveals how intragovernmental micro-incentives drive macro-dynamics and thereby addresses the neglect of horizontal dynamics in multilevel systems. The willingness and capacity of lower-level governments to solve collective problems on their own and to oppose central encroachment are crucial to understand the power distribution in different systems and their long-term evolutions.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEuropean University Instituteen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEUIen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSPSen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPhD Thesisen
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://hdl.handle.net/1814/12969
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccessen
dc.subject.lcshComparative government
dc.subject.lcshFederal government
dc.subject.lcshIntergovernmental cooperation
dc.subject.lcshCentral-local government relations
dc.subject.lcshFederal government -- Case studies
dc.subject.lcshIntergovernmental cooperation -- Case studies
dc.subject.lcshCentral-local government relations -- Case studies
dc.titleInternal government dynamics and the nature of intergovernmental relations : constraints and corridors of organizational adaptation in federal systemsen
dc.typeThesisen
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