Date: 1990
Type: Article
Sur quelques propriétés stratégiques de l'intéressement des salariés dans l'industrie
Revue économique, 1990, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 621-650
BENSAID, Bernard, FEDERBUSCH, Serge, GARY-BOBO, Robert, Sur quelques propriétés stratégiques de l'intéressement des salariés dans l'industrie, Revue économique, 1990, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 621-650
- https://hdl.handle.net/1814/70819
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
We examine the properties of profit-sharing in an oligopoly model of industry. Profit-sharing contracts are viewed as a means of strategic commitment, not as an internal incentive system. In our model, firms choose a contract subject to the employees' participation constraint in a first stage, and compete on the output market in a second stage. We show that the choice of a profit-sharing contract by each firm is a non-cooperative equilibrium. The contract renegotiation issue is then discussed, and it is shown that the adoption of profit-related pay in a given " incumbent " firm can deter entry on the output market, in spite of the fact that profit-sharing contracts are renegotiated, and that players have complete information.
Additional information:
First published: 31 July 1990
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/70819
Full-text via DOI: 10.2307/3501873
ISSN: 0035-2764
Publisher: Presses de Sciences Po
Files associated with this item
Files | Size | Format | View |
---|---|---|---|
There are no files associated with this item. |