dc.contributor.author | BEKISZ, Hubert | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-04-27T08:31:14Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-04-27T08:31:14Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of European competition law & practice, 2021, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 217–235 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 2041-7764 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2041-7772 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/70938 | |
dc.description | Published online on 16 March 2021 | en |
dc.description.abstract | This article raises a research question of when intra-platform algorithmic pricing results in an anticompetitive agreement or concerted practice in the meaning of Article 101 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The taken approach is a combination of an overview of existing types of algorithmic pricing and the case study on the business model of Uber. Selection of Uber is motivated by its great significance on the online platforms’ market. In 2015, Uber has been valued $51 billion and was the only platform next to Facebook to exceed $50 billion threshold.1 Many platforms therefore follow Uber’s business model and the remarks explicitly made on the example of Uber remain relevant to many other Uber-like apps. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Oxford University Press | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of European competition law & practice | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
dc.title | When does algorithmic pricing result in an intra-platform anticompetitive agreement or concerted practice? : the case of Uber in the framework of EU competition law | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/jeclap/lpab017 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 12 | en |
dc.identifier.startpage | 217 | en |
dc.identifier.endpage | 235 | en |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | en |