dc.contributor.author | MIZUSHIMA, Atsue | |
dc.contributor.author | FUTAGAMI, Koichi | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-10-22T16:24:21Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-10-22T16:24:21Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1725-6704 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/7168 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper reexamines results of Konrad and Lommerud (2000). They
construct a two-stage game model of a family. We show that their result
crucially depends on their linear payoff function and obtain an opposite result
if the interaction within a family is represented by a non-linear function; that
is, the interaction exhibits strategic complementarity. | en |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | European University Institute | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | EUI ECO | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2007/28 | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
dc.subject | D13 | en |
dc.subject | J24 | en |
dc.subject | Public goods | en |
dc.subject | Cooperative game | en |
dc.subject | Non-cooperative game | en |
dc.title | The Bargaining Family Revisited: A Comment | en |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.neeo.contributor | MIZUSHIMA|Atsue|aut| | |
dc.neeo.contributor | FUTAGAMI|Koichi|aut| | |
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