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dc.contributor.authorDUTTA, Rohan
dc.contributor.authorLEVINE, David K.
dc.contributor.authorMODICA, Salvatore
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-03T09:43:53Z
dc.date.available2021-09-03T09:43:53Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationJournal of public economic theory, 2021, OnlineFirsten
dc.identifier.issn1097-3923
dc.identifier.issn1467-9779
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/72341
dc.descriptionFirst published online: 27 August 2021en
dc.description.abstractA variety of experimental and empirical research indicate that prosocial behavior is important for economic success. There are two sources of prosocial behavior: incentives and preferences. The latter, the willingness of individuals to “do their bit” for the group, we refer to as internalization, because we view it as something that a group can influence by appropriate investment. This implies that there is a trade-off between using incentives and internalization to encourage prosocial behavior. By examining this trade-off we shed light on the connection between social norms observed inside the laboratory and those observed outside in the field. For example, we show that a higher value of cooperation outside the laboratory may lower the use of incentives inside the laboratory even as it increases their usage outside. As an application we show that the model calibrated to experimental data makes reasonable out-of-sample quantitative forecasts.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThis article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - Wiley Transformative Agreement (2020-2023)en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherWileyen
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of public economic theoryen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.titleThe whip and the Bible : punishment versus internalizationen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/jpet.12540
dc.rights.licenseAttribution 4.0 International*


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Attribution 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 4.0 International