Success in contests

LEVINE, David K.; MATTOZZI, Andrea

doi:10.1007/s00199-021-01367-4

2022

Article

LEVINE, David K.

; MATTOZZI, Andrea

Economic theory, 2022, Vol. 73, pp. 595-624

Cite

LEVINE, David K., MATTOZZI, Andrea, Success in contests, Economic theory, 2022, Vol. 73, pp. 595-624 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/72405

Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository

Models of two contestants exerting effort to win a prize are very common and widely used in political economy. The contest success function plays as fundamental a role in the theory of contests as does the production function in the theory of the firm, yet beyond the existence of equilibrium few general results are known. This paper seeks to remedy that gap.

Additional information:

First published online: 07 May 2021

Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/72405

Full-text via DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01367-4

ISSN: 0938-2259; 1432-0479

Publisher: Springer

Keyword(s): Contests Auctions Discontinuous games All-pay auction C72 D72 D74

Sponsorship and Funder information:

This article received funding from the EUI Research Council and MIUR PRIN 20103S5RN3.

This article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - Springer Transformative Agreement (2020-2024)

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