Success in contests
Economic theory, 2022, Vol. 73, pp. 595-624
LEVINE, David K., MATTOZZI, Andrea, Success in contests, Economic theory, 2022, Vol. 73, pp. 595-624 - https://hdl.handle.net/1814/72405
Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository
Models of two contestants exerting effort to win a prize are very common and widely used in political economy. The contest success function plays as fundamental a role in the theory of contests as does the production function in the theory of the firm, yet beyond the existence of equilibrium few general results are known. This paper seeks to remedy that gap.
First published online: 07 May 2021
Cadmus permanent link: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/72405
Full-text via DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01367-4
ISSN: 0938-2259; 1432-0479
Keyword(s): Contests Auctions Discontinuous games All-pay auction C72 D72 D74
Sponsorship and Funder information:This article received funding from the EUI Research Council and MIUR PRIN 20103S5RN3.This article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - Springer Transformative Agreement (2020-2024)
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