dc.contributor.author | LEVINE, David K. | |
dc.contributor.author | MATTOZZI, Andrea | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-09T09:47:18Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-09T09:47:18Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Economic theory, 2022, Vol. 73, pp. 595-624 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0938-2259 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1432-0479 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1814/72405 | |
dc.description | First published online: 07 May 2021 | en |
dc.description.abstract | Models of two contestants exerting effort to win a prize are very common and widely used in political economy. The contest success function plays as fundamental a role in the theory of contests as does the production function in the theory of the firm, yet beyond the existence of equilibrium few general results are known. This paper seeks to remedy that gap. | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | This article received funding from the EUI Research Council and MIUR PRIN 20103S5RN3. | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | This article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - Springer Transformative Agreement (2020-2024) | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Springer | en |
dc.relation.ispartof | Economic theory | en |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | * |
dc.subject | Contests | en |
dc.subject | Auctions | en |
dc.subject | Discontinuous games | en |
dc.subject | All-pay auction | en |
dc.subject | C72 | en |
dc.subject | D72 | en |
dc.subject | D74 | en |
dc.title | Success in contests | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00199-021-01367-4 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 73 | |
dc.identifier.startpage | 595 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 624 | |
dc.rights.license | Attribution 4.0 International | * |