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dc.contributor.authorLEVINE, David K.
dc.contributor.authorMATTOZZI, Andrea
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-09T09:47:18Z
dc.date.available2021-09-09T09:47:18Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.identifier.citationEconomic theory, 2022, Vol. 73, pp. 595-624en
dc.identifier.issn0938-2259
dc.identifier.issn1432-0479
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1814/72405
dc.descriptionFirst published online: 07 May 2021en
dc.description.abstractModels of two contestants exerting effort to win a prize are very common and widely used in political economy. The contest success function plays as fundamental a role in the theory of contests as does the production function in the theory of the firm, yet beyond the existence of equilibrium few general results are known. This paper seeks to remedy that gap.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThis article received funding from the EUI Research Council and MIUR PRIN 20103S5RN3.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThis article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - Springer Transformative Agreement (2020-2024)
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringeren
dc.relation.ispartofEconomic theoryen
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/*
dc.subjectContestsen
dc.subjectAuctionsen
dc.subjectDiscontinuous gamesen
dc.subjectAll-pay auctionen
dc.subjectC72en
dc.subjectD72en
dc.subjectD74en
dc.titleSuccess in contestsen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00199-021-01367-4
dc.identifier.volume73
dc.identifier.startpage595
dc.identifier.endpage624
dc.rights.licenseAttribution 4.0 International*


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Attribution 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 4.0 International